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Security: github/gh-aw-firewall

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Security

Host runtime IPC boundary

AWF must not expose the runner's default temporary-directory IPC to the agent. The Docker and gVisor Compose agent use private, writable tmpfs filesystems at /tmp and /host/tmp, with mode 1777. Host /tmp is not bind-mounted. This keeps host CoreCLR debugger FIFOs (clr-debug-pipe-*) and diagnostic sockets (dotnet-diagnostic-*) outside the sandbox, including endpoints created after the agent starts. The sbx backend likewise shares /tmp/gh-aw, not the host temporary root; its guest supplies its own /tmp.

The shared exceptions are the /tmp/gh-aw handoff, explicitly configured mounts, the workspace, selected home tool directories, staged runner binaries, and the init-signal/log/session paths. Choosing /tmp as the container working directory does not restore host /tmp sharing. Other host temporary files are no longer implicitly available: stage inputs in a dedicated directory and mount only that directory, for example --mount /tmp/my-inputs:/inputs:ro.

Before launching the command, the Compose agent entrypoint checks the actual container filesystem view under /tmp, /host/tmp, and absolute $TMPDIR, $HOME, and $RUNNER_TEMP paths (including their /host views). It refuses to launch if any CoreCLR endpoint name is visible or a directory cannot be inspected. It does not unlink endpoints, change host process settings, or read runner memory. This also checks the daemon-visible paths on ARC/DinD rather than assuming the runner and daemon have the same filesystem.

This is not a blanket guarantee against IPC placed in intentionally shared directories. The workspace, allowlisted home subdirectories, /tmp/gh-aw, and custom mounts are live host shares. Do not run privileged or credential-holding host services with IPC in them, or mount an IPC directory through another path. A startup check cannot prevent endpoints created later inside these shares, and does not inspect arbitrary custom destination aliases. Read-only binds, owner-only permissions (the agent may have the runner UID), PID/IPC namespaces, and --exclude-env do not prevent communication with a visible host pathname socket or FIFO. Workflows requiring that stronger boundary must avoid such live shares or use an independently isolated execution identity and filesystem. Enabling Docker socket access also grants authority outside this boundary.

The in-container check requires an updated agent image, not just an updated CLI; older pinned images do not contain it. These mount and entrypoint guarantees are for Compose; sbx has the narrowed default share but not this entrypoint check. Cloud Hypervisor and NVX have separate guest/export policies, not the Compose mount tree. See the filesystem sharing contract. Host-side endpoint removal may remain as defense in depth but is not the mechanism protecting private /tmp.

Security reporting

GitHub takes the security of our software products and services seriously, including all of the open source code repositories managed through our GitHub organizations, such as GitHub.

Even though open source repositories are outside of the scope of our bug bounty program and therefore not eligible for bounty rewards, we will ensure that your finding gets passed along to the appropriate maintainers for remediation.

Reporting Security Issues

If you believe you have found a security vulnerability in any GitHub-owned repository, please report it to us through coordinated disclosure.

Please do not report security vulnerabilities through public GitHub issues, discussions, or pull requests.

Instead, please send an email to opensource-security[@]github.com.

Please include as much of the information listed below as you can to help us better understand and resolve the issue:

  • The type of issue (e.g., buffer overflow, SQL injection, or cross-site scripting)
  • Full paths of source file(s) related to the manifestation of the issue
  • The location of the affected source code (tag/branch/commit or direct URL)
  • Any special configuration required to reproduce the issue
  • Step-by-step instructions to reproduce the issue
  • Proof-of-concept or exploit code (if possible)
  • Impact of the issue, including how an attacker might exploit the issue

This information will help us triage your report more quickly.

Policy

See GitHub's Safe Harbor Policy

There aren't any published security advisories